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Abstract 
Countries with significantly different development levels experience similar regulatory transformations 
in the telecommunications industry. While these changes may be particularly successful in lowering 
costs, they may also lead to lower consumer welfare in markets in which consumers are highly 
sensitive to price changes. This paper assessed whether price elasticities for telecommunications 
demand differ between broad groups of countries according to their development levels. We provided 
empirical evidence of differences in estimated demand elasticities between developed and less 
developed countries. Our results suggest that consumers in poorer countries may experience greater 
welfare losses when incentive regulations are implemented.  
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Telecommunications are currently an important issue in the economics literature. 
During the early 1980s a variety of telecommunications empirical cost models applied 
to American firms were published (for a review see Kiss and Lefebvre, 1987). From 
the mid-1980s onwards, regulatory framework models dominated the 
telecommunications literature (Laffont and Tirole, 1993; 2000). Attention focused on 
how to make regulation more efficient in a market in which flaws in information are 
as wide-ranging as the telecommunications industry. Together with technological 
expertise, achieving a good regulatory framework requires cost and demand 
information. Regulated firms often have better knowledge of these matters than do 
regulators. A recent study by Gasmi et al. (1999) established that despite efficiency 
gains from incentive regulatory schemes, consumers might experience significant 
welfare losses1. Thus, to understand the impact of regulatory reforms, it is important 
to analyse telecommunications demand. 
Estimates of price elasticities of demand for telecommunications services are essential 
in measuring the social welfare level attained in any regulatory environment. The 
economic effects of telecommunications regulation vary across countries when there 
are international differences in price elasticities. Despite a large body of literature on 
price elasticities, there are few comparative studies on telecommunications demand at 
an international level. 
Most empirical analyses of telecommunications demand rely on single-country time 
series data and cross-sectional household expenditure. Some of these studies employ 
data from broad groups of telecommunications services (e.g. Griffin, 1982 and Gabel 
and Kennet (so 3 ou mais autores se usa et al), 1993), but only a few consider other 
commodities (e.g. Wolak, 1996). However, other studies, such as those based on 
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energy demand, apply methods that are more consistent with economic theory (e.g. 
Brenton, 1997; Fiebig et al., 1987; Seale et al., 1991 and Rothman et al., 1994). By 
applying several aggregation techniques, these latter studies draw on a complete 
system of demand equations. Static and dynamic versions of this method were used in 
the present study to obtain price elasticity estimates based on cross-country demand 
data, some of the demand data were observed at two points in time. 
This paper aimed to analyze the extent to which price elasticities for 
telecommunications differ between broad groups of countries classified according to 
per capita income levels. To accomplish this, we employed data published in 'World 
Comparisons of Real Gross Domestic Product and Purchasing Power', a United 
Nations publication, and data from the International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU) on-line database. 
We obtained empirical evidence of differences in demand parameter estimates 
between rich and poor countries. The telecommunications elasticities derived suggest 
that price elasticities are relatively greater in poorer countries. 
Although the observed changes in regulatory regimes tend to induce cost 
minimization by firms and restrain monopoly power, these changes relax consumer 
welfare constraints (e.g. price-cap regulation2). When price elasticities are higher, 
consumers suffer significant welfare losses because incumbent firms benefit from an 
information rent and charge prices that are higher than their marginal costs. Our 
results suggest that recent regulatory trends may induce a greater social welfare loss in 
less developed countries. 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces the system of demand 
equations used to obtain estimated elasticities. Section 3 describes the data and 
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estimation procedures employed. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Finally, 
section 5 concludes with a discussion of the findings and their significance to 
telecommunications regulation. 
 
2. Methodological Issues 
 
This study aimed to analyze the extent to which price elasticities for 
telecommunications differ between rich and poor countries. To accomplish this, static 
restricted, static non-restricted and dynamic Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) 
specification forms were estimated. In order to evaluate how sensitive results are to 
alternative specifications, a logarithmic demand model is also estimated. 
The Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) is a flexible functional form employed in 
many demand studies (Wan, 1998). As Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) stated, the 
AIDS is a system of demand equations that starts from a specific class of preferences 
to define a system of demand equations that satisfies the axioms of consumer choice 
and, by aggregation, avoids strong restrictions such as parallel linear Engel curves. 
The budget share of each good is a linear function of the logarithm of total 
expenditure and of the logarithm of prices. The AIDS model represents a flexible 
demand system of the Translog and PIGLOG family and can be considered as a first-
order approximation to any demand system3.  
The AIDS specification for the ith good and expressed in share form corresponds to, 
∑
=
++=
n
j
jijiii pP
M
w
1
ln)ln( γβα .  (1) 
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There are n goods and n equations, where wi represent consumer demand share 
equations which are determined by current prices pj ,  consumer real income is 
represented by M and P is a price index defined by, 
∑∑∑ ++=
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The property of ''adding-up'' is satisfied when, 
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Furthermore, homogeneity and symmetry can be expressed respectively as, 
∑ =
j
ij 0γ   (4) 
and, 
jiij γγ = .  (5) 
Finally, for preference maximization, the Slutsky substitution matrix (S), has generic 
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where qi denotes the quantity of good i. Matrix S must satisfy the symmetry and 
negative semi-definiteness requirements. This restriction is tested for any given 
estimates by looking at the eigenvalues of the Slustky matrix at every observation. 
This study also considered a specification that allows for a different effect when 
prices and income change. The dynamic specification of the AIDS model, as proposed 
by Anderson and Blundell (1984), supposes that consumer demand may not 
immediately adjust to price and income changes. In order to accommodate this, these 
authors propose a specification in which the shares, wi, are determined by current 
 6
prices pj, and consumer real income, M, as well as by the previous period’s 
disequilibrium in consumption wit-1L-wit-1. 
The dynamic AIDS specification corresponds to, 
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where ∆ is the first-difference operator, t indicates time and λ is the adjustment 
coefficient4. 
To check the validity of our estimates, we also estimated a logarithmic demand 
model. This demand specification corresponds to:  
∑
=
++=
n
j
jijiii pMq
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lnlnln γβα ,  (8) 
where again qi denotes the quantity of good i, pi is the price of good i and M is the 
consumer’s expenditure. The ijγ  coefficient gives the long-run price elasticity estimate 
for the ith good with respect to pj. Despite its microeconomic and econometric 
weaknesses (Varian, 1990), this specification has been used in a variety of demand 
empirical studies of telecommunications: see the survey by Taylor (1994). 
Once we obtained the static and dynamic AIDS parameter estimates, we can calculate 
the long-run price elasticity estimates using, 
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or alternatively 
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where again δij corresponds to the Kronecker's delta and 
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c
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represents the compensated price elasticities for the ith good with respect to pj and ei 
is the expenditure elasticity for good i. 
 
3. Data and Estimation Procedures 
 
In this paper, demand model parameters were estimated using data published in 
'World Comparisons of Real Gross Domestic Product and Purchasing Power', a 
United Nations publication for the years 1980 and 1985, and data from the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) on-line database for the same period. 
Data is taken from 74 developing and developed countries covering seven groups of 
consumer goods and services, namely, telecommunications (1); food, beverages, 
tobacco; clothing and footwear (2); rents, fuel and power (3); transport (4); education 
and recreational activities (5); and other goods and services (6). 
In the AIDS model framework, the sum of the share equations is equal to unity, 
leading to a singular variance-covariance matrix. This problem can be resolved by 
dropping one of the equations and estimating the resulting n-1 equations by applying 
Zellner's seemingly unrelated regressions estimator (SURE)5. McGuire et al. (1968) 
demonstrated that the estimates are invariant to the equation deleted. 
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Although the AIDS system is non-linear, it can be linearized using the Stone price 
index6. Therefore, our estimation of this system is based on the Deaton-Muellbauer 
Iterative (DMI) procedure7. Wan (1998) showed that even when this technique 
produces biased estimates of the iα  and γij parameters, unbiased estimates of the βi 
parameters are produced. Hence, this technique is shown to be the most suitable 
procedure to adopt for these types of empirical demand models. 
To test for differences in telecommunications demand between rich and poor 
countries, we included a dummy variable in the static AIDS model that takes a value 
of unity when the country's per capita gross domestic product (in US dollars at 
international prices) is greater than 3.500, and otherwise zero. To validate the results 
obtained, three logarithmic demand models were estimated: one for all countries, 
another for rich countries only and the third for poor countries only. 
Of the 74 countries included in the data set, 42 were observed in two time periods. 
Hence, we also tested the existence of fixed effects and time effects in 
telecommunications demand within the logarithmic demand model estimation 
procedure. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
The results for the estimation of the dynamic AIDS model are shown in Tables I and 
II. The results for the static models appear in Tables III and IV and Logarithmic 
                                                           
6 The Stone's (1953) index weighs the price of each good by its budget share. 
7 The DMI procedure is discussed in Wan (1998). By employing Stone's index and applying SURE, we 
obtain estimates of alpha and gamma. These estimates are used to calculate lnPt and we can compute 
the regression of the SURE model. The DMI method consists of continuing this iterative process until 
convergence is achieved. 
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demand model estimates appear in Tables V and VI. Finally, the estimates for 
elasticities are shown in Table VII.  
The main result for the AIDS model suggests that telecommunications demand does 
not immediately adjust to price changes. Although the λ parameter is not statistically 
significant, the likelihood ratio test statistic for this hypothesis is 37.36. Given that the 
5% critical value from the chi-squared distribution with eight degrees of freedom is 
15.51, the hypothesis that there is an immediate adjustment is rejected. Thus, 
according to these results it seems that the existence of a negative time effect in 
telecommunications demand should not be rejected. 
The analysis of the likelihood ratio, lagrange multiplier and Hausman statistics 
displayed in table V suggests that the time and country fixed effects logarithmic 
demand model is preferable for these data. This result seems to reinforce the idea that 
there are significant time and country-fixed effects in telecommunications demand. 
Thus, the hypothesis of equal demand parameters for different countries should be 
rejected and the presence of time effects should be considered. According to the 
specification that includes time and country fixed effects, the elasticity of demand for 
telecommunications is 1.10, which is lower than the AIDS estimates. 
The dummy variable coefficients in the static AIDS models are statistically significant 
at the 5% level. Thus, the hypothesis that the parameters in both groups of countries 
are equal is also rejected. 
The dynamic AIDS model produces telecommunications elasticities that range from 
2.29 in richer countries to 2.42 in poorer countries. In the static AIDS model, they 
range from 1.21 to 1.91. The elasticity of demand for telecommunications in less 
developed countries is higher than that in rich countries for all demand specifications 
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analysed. The logarithmic demand model estimated elasticities range from 1.43 in rich 
countries to 1.62 in poor countries. 
These findings support the assumptions underlying demand theory, i.e., that demand 
is more elastic in smaller markets, where the diffusion process is in its initial phase, 
and whose elasticity decreases as the diffusion process occurs. 
When price elasticities are higher in poorer countries, consumers in these countries 
will suffer significant welfare losses if incentive regulation is implemented because 
incumbent firms benefit from information rents and can charge prices above their 
marginal costs. Thus, our results suggest that actual regulatory trends will lead to 
social welfare losses in less developed countries. In these countries, consumers 
usually have less power to favourably influence regulatory agencies8 and firms have 
higher rents and rates of return, leading to lower consumer welfare. 
                                                           
8 For details, see Laffont et al. (1993). 
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Table I - "Dynamic AIDS model estimates" 
Parameters Estimates Parameters. Estimates 
αi -0.0475* λ -0.1828 
 (-2.57)*  (-0.42) 
 (0.01)**  (0.68) 
βiC 0.0004 βiL 0.0471* 
 (0.00)  (3.65) 
 (0.97)  (0.00) 
γ1jC 0.0102* γ1jL 0.0047 
 (2.86)  (1.38) 
 (0.00)  (0.17) 
γ2jC 0.0201* γ2jL 0.0229* 
 (2.33)  (3.20) 
 (0.02)  (0.00) 
γ3jC 0.0033 γ3jL 0.0130* 
 (0.89)  (3.62) 
 (0.38)  (0.00) 
γ4jC  0.0073 γ4 jL 0.0132* 
 (1.48)  (1.95) 
 (0.14)  (0.05) 
γ5jC -0.0017 γ5jL -0.0168* 
 (-0.37)  (-2.57) 
 (0.71)  (0.01) 
γ6jC -0.0391* γ6jL -0.0270* 
 (-4.78)  (-3.37) 
 (0.00)  (0.00) 
lnL 158.98 DW=1.95 N=41 
The first number inside brackets is the “t-value”. The second number inside brackets is the 
“P-value”. * Indicates significance at the α=0.05 level. 
 ** Indicates significance at the α=0.1 level. 
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Table II - "Adjustment hypothesis results" 
Hypothesis λ=1,βiC= βiL and γijC=γijL 
lnLr 140.30 
lnLur 158.98 
LR 37.36 
restrictions 8 
χ2 0.01 20.09 
χ2 0.05 15.51 
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Table III - "Static AIDS model estimates" 
 Telec. Food, 
Clothing  
Rent. Fuel.  
Power 
Transp. Rec.Educ. Others 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
αi 0.0010 0.8020* -0.0289 0.0668** 0.1080* 0.0508 
 (0.12) (12.94) (-0.74) (2.31) (3.13) (1.20) 
 (0.91) (0.00) (0.46) (0.02) (0.00) (0.23) 
βi 0.0028 -0.1327* 0.0471* 0.0045 0.0076 0.0708* 
 (0.95) (-6.65) (3.61) (0.47) (0.69) (5.06) 
 (0.34) (0.00) (0.00) (0.64) (0.49) (0.00) 
γ1j -0.0049* 0.0052 -0.0009 0.0062* -0.0009 -0.0046 
 (-4.13) (1.51) (-0.52) (3.09) (-0.42) (-1.47) 
 (0.00) (0.13) (0.60) (0.00) (0.68) (0.14) 
γ2j  -0.0132 0.0670* -0.0223 -0.0366* -0.0001 
  (-0.44) (5.84) (-1.85) (-2.73) (-0.01) 
  (0.66) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01) (0.99) 
γ3j   -0.0248* -0.0038 0.0002 -0.0376* 
   (-3.28) (-0.71) (0.03) (-4.69) 
   (0.00) (0.48) (0.98) (0.00) 
γ4j     0.0081 -0.0001 0.0119 
    (0.95) (-0.01) (1.33) 
    (0.34) (0.99) (0.19) 
γ5j     0.0202 0.0172 
     (1.90) (1.66) 
     (0.06) (0.10) 
γ6j      0.0133 
      (0.73) 
      (0.46) 
di 0.0069* -0.0947* 0.0039 0.0320* 0.0368* 0.0151 
 (2.69) (-4.59) (0.30) (3.27) (3.15) (1.03) 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.76) (0.00) (0.00) (0.30) 
logL 1237.7  N=116    
The first number inside brackets is the “t-value”.The second number inside brackets is the “P-
value”.* Indicates significance at the α=0.05 level. ** Indicates significance at the 
α=0.1 level.  
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Table IV- "Non-Restricted AIDS model estimates" 
Parameters Estimates 
α1 -0.013
 
 (-1.37) 
 (0.17) 
β1 0.007* 
 (2.34) 
 (0.02) 
γ1 -0.003* 
 (-2.05) 
 (0.04) 
γ2 0.005 
 (1.49) 
 (0.14) 
γ3 0.001 
 (0.40) 
 (0.69) 
γ4 0.006* 
 (2.56) 
 (0.01) 
γ5 -0.003 
 (-1.09) 
 (0.28) 
γ6 -0.003 
 (-0.80) 
 (0.42) 
d1 0.006* 
 (2.15) 
 (0.03) 
R2=0.48 N=116 
The first number inside brackets is the “t-value”. The second number inside brackets is the 
“P-value”. * Indicates significance at the α=0.05 level. ** Indicates significance at the 
α=0.1 level. 
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Table V - "Logarithmic demand model estimates" 
Parameters Without 
effects (1) 
Fixed 
effects 
model (2) 
Random 
effects model 
(3) 
Fixed and 
time effects 
(4) 
Random and 
time effects 
(5) 
αI -9.7  -10.02 -11.97 -9.85 
 (-10.17)  (-10.11) (-3.32) (-9.49) 
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
βI 1.59 2.35 1.62 1.86 1.61 
 (14.31) (5.56) (13.80) (4.33) (13.75) 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
γ1j -1.67 -1.52 -1.69 -1.10 -1.15 
 (-10.51) (-6.71) (-11.20) (-4.23) (-6.61) 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
γ2j 0.89 1.78 1.15 1.77 0.81 
 (2.33) (2.45) (3.17) (2.64) (2.24) 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) 
γ3j -0.03 -0.25 -0.17 -0.06 0.003 
 (-0.15) (-0.96) (-0.92) (-0.25) (0.02) 
 (0.88) (0.34) (0.36) (0.81) (0.95) 
γ4j  0.67 0.07 0.63 -0.56 -0.20 
 (2.35) (0.15) (2.34) (-1.13) (-0.66) 
 (0.02) (0.88) (0.02) (0.26) (0.51) 
γ5j -0.41 0.76 -0.27 0.67 -0.001 
 (-1.22) (1.23) (-0.84) (1.18) (-0.00) 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.40) (0.24) (0.99) 
γ6j -0.49 -1.38 -0.70 -1.61 -0.50 
 (-1.06) (-1.35) (-1.51) (-1.70) (-1.1) 
 (0.29) (0.18) (0.13) (0.09) (0.27) 
Likelihood 
Ratio test 
 
LR 
Degrees of 
freedom 
 
Prob. 
  
(2) vs (1) 198 73 0.00   
(4) vs (2) 22.17 1 0.00   
(4) vs (1) 220 75 0.00   
Lagrange 
Multiplier 
 
ML 
Degrees of 
freedom 
 
Prob. 
  
(2)(3) vs 
(1) 
0.65 1 0.42   
(4)(5) vs 
(1) 
29.87 2 0.00   
Hausman      
(4) vs (5) 16.31 7 0.02   
The first number inside brackets is the “t-value”.The second number inside brackets is the “P-
value”. * Indicates significance at the α=0.05 level.  ** Indicates significance at the 
α=0.1 level.
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Table VI- "Logarithmic demand model estimates" 
Rich countries  Poor countries 
Parameters Estimates Parameters. Estimates 
α1 -11.16* α1 -9.19* 
 (-2.80)  (-6.56) 
 (0.01)  (0.00) 
β1 1.77* β1 1.46* 
 (3.99)  (7.87) 
 (0.00)  (0.00) 
γ1 -1.43* γ1 -1.62* 
 (-5.73)  (-7.66) 
 (0.00)  (0.00) 
γ2 -0.17 γ2 1.37* 
 (-0.28)  (2.63) 
 (0.78)  (0.01) 
γ3 -0.68* γ3 0.01 
 (-2.17)  (0.04) 
 (0.04)  (0.97) 
γ4 1.15* γ4  0.50 
 (2.39)  (1.41) 
 (0.02)  (0.16) 
γ5 1.13** γ5 -0.77** 
 (1.96)  (-1.83) 
 (0.06)  (0.07) 
γ6 -1.11** γ6 -0.50 
 (-1.67)  (-0.80) 
 (0.10)  (0.43) 
R2=0.96 N=43 R2=0.90 N=72 
The first number inside brackets is the “t-value”. The second number inside brackets is the 
“P-value”. * Indicates significance at the α=0.05 level. ** Indicates significance at the 
α=0.1 level. 
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Table VII - "Price elasticities of telecommunications demand" 
Average price elasticities 1980 1985 
Static e11 e11c e11 e11c 
Restricted Model     
Rich countries 1.298 1.275 1.229 1.201 
Other countries 1.854 1.837 1.278 1.252 
Non-Restricted Model     
Rich countries 1.330 1.309 1.208 1.180 
Other countries 1.905 1.896 1.382 1.363 
Dynamic Model     
Rich countries   2.29 2.38 
Other countries   2.42 2.50 
 
 18
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, by estimating alternative systems of demand equations and using cross-
country consumption data, we provided evidence that price elasticities are greater in 
less developed countries. Similar results have been obtained in studies that analyse 
different industries (see Fiebig et al., 1987; Seale et al., 1991; Rothman et al., 1994). 
This study’s results seem to reinforce the idea that there are significant time and 
country fixed effects in telecommunications demand. Thus, telecommunications 
regulation agencies should take into account demand differences between rich and 
poor countries. These differences prove crucial in the study of telecommunications 
policy. In markets as highly regulated as telecommunications, these demand 
differences can translate into significant welfare losses for telecommunications 
consumers in less developed countries. 
Given emerging telecommunications markets and weaker consumer interest groups, 
less developed countries also have less power to influence regulatory agency 
decisions, and as a consequence, are more likely to incur significant welfare losses. 
These results, however, should be interpreted with caution due to the relatively small 
sample size used. Clearly, further research, possibly involving the use of different data 
sets, should be directed towards the analysis of differences in demand types between 
broad groups of countries in order to ascertain the validity of the findings presented 
here. 
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